I have finally been won over to noneism and a relational theory of intentionality (i.e. a kind of Meinongianism).
Noneism is the view that there are some things that do not exist. That is, we can quantify over non-existent things using the particular quantifier (also known misleadingly as the existential quantifier).
For years now, I have tried to hold to a non-relational theory of intentionality, hypothesizing a non-relational transcendence of minds to their intentional objects. I now see that this is hopelessly incoherent.
Yet, I still believe that intentionality is the mark of the mental, ala Brentano, and that substance dualism is the result. There is something that Meinongianism cannot neatly account for and that is misrepresentation. If the ‘meaning’ of thought is always provided by a relation to the object itself, whether existing or non-existent, then how can we ever be wrong in the way we think about the world?
I think that the kind of incompleteness or objective lack that is required to explain misrepresentation is still something that distinguishes mind stuff from physical stuff. Nothing in the physical world lacks for anything, it is only our assessment of it that suggests that something is missing. This ability to be a lack (as Sartre would say – that well-known substance dualist… not!) is what characterizes the mental, together with its internal relations to intentional objects.
Actually, this change of heart is allowing me to look with fresh eyes at the paper I bagged in my last post. It might still be on to something after all.
0 Responses to “Surrender to Noneism”