I’ve recently been rethinking whether or not I should be a property dualist as opposed to a substance dualist.
I am intuitively inclined towards the latter. However, if property dualism is as good as substance dualism in accounting for the phenomena then Ockham’s Razor says that we should side with property dualism (‘we’ being dualists – though, not so-called predicate or concept dualists). Ceteris paribus, property dualism wins. I tried to defuse this view in a recent post by arguing that Ockham’s Razor doesn’t really favour one view or the other, but I soon realised that I was just blowing hot air.
This has lead me to try fleshing out the intuition that pulls me towards substance dualism in the first place. I think that what I’m moved by is that substance dualism has the unity of the mind on its side. Physical structures are divisible down, at least, to the subatomic level. Whatever the physical properties are that mental properties are meant to supervene over at nearby worlds, because the brain is a somewhat homogenous physical system, there will be many, many physical subsystems in the brain that also meet the criteria for lawful correlation with mental properties. The brain is, not only complex, but complex in a way that renders its parts functionally similar to the whole. This should mean that, just as the brain has many more or less distributed parts, so should the mind have many more or less distributed parts.
On the contrary, it appears that the different modalities of consciousness and other mental states possess a fundamental unity. The qualia, beliefs, desires and other mental states are such that one can say of all of them, however diverse, that that are ‘mine.’ There is a primitive subjectivity that binds the whole show together. It also appears essential to these mental states that they are unified in this way, e.g. the same token belief cannot exist in more than one mind, let alone exist without a broader mind of any kind.
In short, though the brain exhibits anatomic complexity, the mind appears to exhibit atomic simplicity, and it seems unlikely that the latter could emerge out of the former given the homogeneity of the former.
Kant thought that unity was one of the necessary conditions of consciousness. However, unsurprisingly, this did not mean for Kant that the mind in-itself – the noumenal mind – was necessarily unified. The phenomenon of unity could turn out to be nothing more than the mere phenomenon – though it is necessary that we see ourselves that way. Indeed, Dan Dennett thinks that the idea of a uniquely consciousness self is such an illusion, instead offering his multiple-drafts theory of consciousness. If we cross Dan Dennett with David Chalmers, we could imagine a property dualist willing to agree with the above assessment of property dualism as resulting in a complex mental life, but who is happy to accept the multiple drafts view of consciousness in place of a simple Cartesian theatre. As Chalmers’ dualism is one of functional/physical and phenomenal properties, and not a broader dualism of representational and physical properties, this does not really seem to be too much of a stretch. Chalmers is already signed up to the extended mind thesis, after all.
Anyway, how do I respond to such a chimerical property-dualist monster? I think that Chimera makes a very strong claim if he denies that persons have a unified mind at any one time. I guess that I am, once more, appealing to my intuitions. However, I can now be confident that I have articulated them and I can be called to account about them. In articulating my intuitions, I am probably making myself vulnerable to counterexamples from thought experiments or findings from cognitive and abnormal psychology, though I cannot imagine how. Oh, well. We all have to come to account at some time.
At least the unity intuition is something to keep Ockham’s Razor at bay, ‘cause all things aint equal no more.
Afterthought
I think that I have been too concessionary to Chimera above.
Chimera is committed to saying that the mind that produces reports of consciousness is always the one that supervenes over the simplest possible functional units of the brain. Otherwise, a mind would report being transparently anatomic and lacking the unity of consciousness. Yet, that the mind that produces reports of consciousness is (almost?) always the one that supervenes over the simplest possible functional unit of the brain seems highly unlikely. Further, it seems unlikely that the simplest possible functional units of the brain, though meeting the criteria for a lawful correlation to mental states, would be anywhere near as sophisticated as is necessary to produce the sophistication of mental states of which reports are received from subjects.
well, i have to say it, this entery totally agrees with everything i think.
the idea of the unity of consciousness being an illusion really really zones me out.
– an illusion to whom?
imm not at all sure how i could possibly get around this this kind of difficulty.
however as a physics student (and not much of a philosopher), i think the cheif difficulty comes in arguing Ockham’s rasor in favor of mind brain interraction
i think a lot of people would rather think of their consciousness as a disunity then believe a daily miracle, as such.
on the other hand i think it could be argued that substance dualism should be preferred as to keep the physics cleaner.
ie. having your mental and physical in two different baskets, rather than smeared together in the one.
thanks.
Yeah, thanks. I just don’t think that I’ve convinced myself on this one. I think that property dualism can probably provide sufficient grounds for unity; Ockham’s Razor is a big bother; and property dualism can still keep mind and matter in different baskets, as you say.
I’m starting to think that property dualism is the way to go.
really?
how could property dualism keep conscious unity?
imm not a big reader and thus imm a bit hazy about the boarders of property dualism.
it seems like property dualism defines the brain to be a ‘whole’ and asserts that it has mental properties.
from this i can see how they could make the statement: mind=brain (as John Searle does) and thus keep unity.
i can see that this makes a very elegent thesis, and it accords with most (at least of my) intuitions on the mind.
however if i have understood it correctly my greatest difficulty with property dualism is that it isnt reductive as it nessisarily describes the brain as a ‘whole’.
i gather that the usual formulation is that the mental states (as fundamentally different properties) emerge out of brain complexity.
the concepts of: ‘wholeness’, fundamentally different properties emerging and ‘brain complexity’ simply dont gel with anything i know that is even remotely described in physics (which is systematically reductive..).
Thus it seems like its up to us to decide which one better satisfies Ockhams razor.
imm interested in property dualism and what can be made of it, however i can say that personally imm very unlikely to part with Reductionism.
thanks again.
Here’s a thought about property dualism and unity.
Instead of relying on the unity of the brain or some other part of the body, you might get unity another way.
First, you might think that the irreducibly non-physical properties are representational properties rather than phenomenal properties.
Second, you might accept that representations may be ‘faceted’, i.e. a representation x may represent both y and z, not by representing a proposition including ‘y and z’ or a relation between x and y, but just representing each of them distinctly in a way that is just as primitve as the property of representativity itself.
Then you can conclude that the mind is just a very complex representation with many facets. Because they are all facets of the one representation, you get your unity.
In terms of property dualism, it is not necessary that the whole brain is the locus of these unified representational properties. It is a further question as to what the physical correlates of such properties are, and even if it is possible for many such minds to be located in the same skull – suggesting a kind of pandemonium theory of property dualism.
There seems to be an assumption in your post that physicalism cannot provide the unity that you seek Certainly materialism cannot provide this unity but physicalism is not so limited.
See Materialists should read this first and Dualism is a physical problem
hmmm. that is actually rather thought provoking.
cool, i can see that, so talking about the mind as representational allows a great deal of flexibility.
i suppose the terms are superveniance and multiple realizability. (if ive spelt it right)
so the time on my watch is a representational property of the watch, as it represents the time.
yet my watch could be analogue, or digital or made out of playdough… (perhaps).
and this should make sense considering every one of our brains is a probably unique.
and i suppose if my watch were digital and you read it upside down it could spell a word – so yeah different facets.
yet imm still in a bit of a spin, because functions, patterns, forms, representations, events and systems are all abstractions.
can the mind (and consciousness) itself be an abstract object? – (just like the number 1)
that feels so totally wrong!
i mean maybee there is some algorithm running in deep reality that detects when the atoms of a persons brain line up in a ‘just so’ fashon – and then bang.
i certainly think that its apropriate to think about a persons general state of mind in an abstract way, but wether that is what the mind IS or not i would say is a very different question.
imm sorry, this feels like its turning into a forum post.
imm very interested in what you think, but dont feel that you have to reply.
umm John.
yeah.
i can say that imm deeply skeptical about Quantum Mechanics or Special relativity making the brain ’special’ in any way.
imm about to face a Quantum Mechanics exam next monday and i am relatively comfortable in telling you that every fundamental process of QM happens just the same inside the brain as out.
and ditto for everything in special relativity.
if however the Mind (as the thing that exhibits consciousness) is in any way involved with the implications of special relativity or QM then it is a very deeply physical thing indeed.
indeed if i contemplate my own position of Substance Dualism then yeah… perhaps that might be.
however if the mind is as deeply physical as the ‘form’ of the brain (just like the ‘form’ of the tomato) i see no reason why physicists should not be able to squash every mention of it from their theories.
i dont want to rubbish thoes ideas, however i can say that imm extremely sceptical.
the only way i can see deep physics coinciding with the ‘form’ of the brain given Naturalism is via Panpsychism.
this is rich comming from a person who likes Substance Dualism, i know.
Mark,
I don’t see representational properties as abstract properties, but rather as primitive, concrete properties – hence, dualism. This means that the example of a watch might be helpful, but I would tend to see its representational properties as being derived from the primitive representational properties of minds.
John,
My original post suggested that that substance dualism accounted for mental unity better than property dualism, and dualism was being assumed all ’round. So, I would not want to suggest that physicalism does not have its own way of providing for unity. I was not going there at all.
Having said that, I’ve given away the original argument, as well.
John.
sorry, my post might have been a bit hard.
its just that imm pretty sure that the brain, nor any sector of it could ever really be regarded as a quantum object.
and unless the mind as a ‘form’ is a platonic form or something like that, imm not sure what ‘form’ could otherwise mean other than a descriptive pattern.
i gather that physicalism is normative (i think thats the term) and thus a ‘form’ is not a singular (and unified) thing that exists under physicalism.
David.
thanks for replying, imm starting to see that i live in a very shoddy world that dosnt really work for philosophy.
i am beginning to see that imm locked into thinking about the material world as sort of like the sand on the beach – trillions of totally disjointed particles.
thank you for responding.
Mark said: “i can say that I’m deeply skeptical about Quantum Mechanics or Special relativity making the brain ’special’ in any way.”
Well, Herman Weyl, who you should have come across in your relativity studies, said that reality is a “four-dimensional continuum which is neither ‘time’ nor ’space’. Only the consciousness that passes on in one portion of this world experiences the detached piece which comes to meet it and passes behind it, as history, that is, as a process that is going forward in time and takes place in space” (See Petkov (2006) for a modern update on Weyl’s viewpoint). So, OK, your lecturers did not point out the problem of the incompleteness of the theory that was evident to Weyl (who was one of the fathers of GR and got a Nobel prize for his work).
Similarly there are observer related problems with quantum theory. The preferred basis for decoherence can explain the collapse of a wavefunction in the absence of an observer but then we end up with anthropic cosmological theories to provide an environment where observers could exist. If we introduce the observer into the theory instead of avoiding it we end up with almost the same outcome – that the environmental preferred basis would be of a type to support an observer.
The issue here is how far are these problems (and other similar problems) a result of failing to include our conscious experience in physical theory? Certainly Weyl’s problem is nakedly due to the absence of any account of conscious observation in the theory. Given that there are indeed problems with physical theory related to conscious observation is it outrageous to suggest that the explanation of conscious observation will involve the physics of the brain?
In fact the problem is simpler, if our task is to explain perception we run into difficulties almost immediately. How would you explain how we see a simultaneous slab of blue sky, apparently out there, beyond the trees, when in information processing terms all that you have is a set of depolarised nerve cells? How can a set of moving ions crossing a membrane make this view? That is the problem, and given that it involves a view that contains things distributed in space and time it would be amazing if relativity and qm were not involved given that these theories are today’s physics.
(See Time and conscious experience)
Petkov, V. (2006). Is There an Alternative to the Block Universe View?, in: D. Dieks and M. Redei (eds.), The Ontology of Spacetime. Series on the Philosophy and Foundations of Physics (Elsevier, Amsterdam)
A ‘form’ can be dealt with in physics as a spacetime manifold. It is the introduction of time that makes this geometrical entity bizarre and fascinating, especially if dimensional time exists (see Some notes on projective geometry).
Ok. maybee i need to make myself clearer.
i wasnt saying that the brain was not quantum mechanical (QM), or had nothing to do with special relativity (SR).
for the brain is a physical object just like anything else in the world and presumably all are governed by the same physics.
i was saying that if the operation of the brain utilised particular implications of QM or SR – that is over and above the results you’de expect from classical physics then i would be supprised.
(ok, so neurotransmitters are QM – but the whole brain?)
what i was trying to say was (at least to me) very simple:
consciousness is either fundamental or its not.
if it is not fundamental then consciousness is an outcome of the interaction of particles in my brain.
some of these particles may occasionally be in quantum superposition states (where their joint properties are indeterminate) or the ‘events’ of one particle may occupy the same position in spacetime as the ‘event’ of another.
but yet – no matter what – they still are distinct and my brain is composed of them.
if consciousness is not fundamentally different to the outcome of interacting particles, then the Mind is a product of the brain.
another effect, product or outcome of interacting particles is the ‘tomatoiness’ of tomatoes.
the ‘tomatoiness’ of tomatoes comes from the particles that make the tomato (that is irrespective of SR, QM whatsoever).
you may at this point wish to say that consciousness is a fundamentally different outcome/effect/product of interracting particles, but in order to do so you must state that it is fundamentally different – and thus fundamental.
now, current physics may reference the ‘observer’.
but there is two distinct meanings to ‘observer’, a literal and an abstract sense.
it is the abstract sense that is taken in SR:
an ‘observer’ need not be conscious (eg. a Camera) and furthermore an ‘observer’ could be any moving (or not)reference point space/time.
i only need to state that the brain (and thus the mind) is not a singular point in space.
the only physics that i know that refers to the literal conscious observer is a particular interpretation of QM that demands a non-material mind (fundamentally different) in order to collapse the wavefunction (and it is HIGHLY ridiculed).
now all this is by-the-by, because although current physics may reference an ‘observer’ as they please, it would truely be absurd (if not even contradicting) if fundamental physics nessisarily referenced the Mind.
just in the same way as it would be absurd if fundamental physics referenced ‘tomatoiness’.
(and anthropic reasoning does NOT negate this. ROFL)
now, of course a true description of our brains, and thus our minds would include QM, SR etc. but that is still beside the point.
and indeed you could say (perhaps) that the mind/brain is a ’spacetime manifold’, if so then i would have to respond that so then is ‘tomatoiness’/tomatoes.
Now if the mind and consciousness IS fundamental, then its a whole different kettle of fish.
it seems to me, that from here on in there seems to be two simple questions:
1. do particles possess this fundamentally different thing?
2. and is reductionism true?
if particles dont, and reductionism true, then no arrangement of any particles whatsoever will ever produce consciousness.
(ie. 0 = 0+0+0+0+…)
whereby if consciousness is said to exist, then Substance dualism is nessisary.
if particles dont, and reductionism false, then you must believe in some form of non-reductive emergence of this fundamental thing:
(ie. 1 = 0+0+0+0+…)
if particles do, and reductionism is true, then you have an Extreme form of pansychism in which every particle is conscious.
(ie. 5 = 1+1+1+1+1)
that is: that every particle is conscious (partly or not) and there is no such thing as a ‘whole’ object (ie. whole brain)
if particles do, and reductionism is false, then i believe that that is regular form of pancsychim.
(ie. 1 = 1+1+1+1+…) = my ‘whole’ brain is itself conscious and composed of particles that are individually (partly or not) conscious.
i personally hold that the mind is fundamental, particles dont have it, and that reductionism is true.
therefore i am a substance dualist.
indeed QM and SR are very fascinating additions to the world, i indeed love studying them, and i can see that they will probably be involved in the identification of what the Mind is or how it operates in the brain.
imm sorry for this long post – i felt that i needed to clear my throat on this.
Nice post.
I would suggest that conscious experience marks the existence of at least one more independent direction for arranging things than are considered in relativity. Probably a time-like dimension with the same signature as the spatial dimensions (ie: a 5D spacetime of a type that is not ruled out by elementary considerations of extensive extra dimensions). I suggest this on largely empirical grounds (ie: on what experience is like – see Time and conscious experience) although there are plenty of physicists who are toying with proposals of this type and have been since de Sitter.
Particles don’t ‘possess’ a dimension of spacetime so I am not sure your reasoning applies to this possibility. The principle advantage from the point of view of conscious experience is that an extra dimension gives us a ‘point of view’. In a 5D spacetime there are points such that:
0 = dx2 + dy2 + dz2 – (cdt)2 + dT2
Taken literally (ie:with an existent dimensional time) this allows events at two times to be in one place simultaneously.
If we can have a length of experienced time available at this
instant then we can see movements and hear whole bars of tunes in the way that we see and hear them.
Does this allow panpsychism? Well, awareness requires feedback from the events that are experienced to the system that produces these events so I would suggest that an information processor would need to be producing the events within experience. How would the feedback work? There are several possibilities, for instance a weak emergent force that occurs as a result of 5D spacetime in a similar way to how magnetism emerges from 4D spacetime..
Incidently, in your discussion of ‘arrangements’ of particles you seem to be missing the fact that spacetime is a pseudo-euclidean manifold with a ‘negative dimension’. This allows weird arrangements, for instance, taken literally it would allow a whole sphere of events to also be at a point as well as distributed in space and time (see Some notes on projective geometry.
ps: I didn’t answer the first part of your post about physical observation. There is a difference between measurement and observation and, as Stein put it, “in Einstein Minkowski spacetime an event’s present is constituted by itself alone” (see <a href="http://newempiricism.blogspot.com/2009/01/simultaneity-key-to-understanding-mind.html"< article on simultaneity).
well John.
i truely do think that in many ways you are really on track, for instance, you acknowledge that the infomation present to the senses needs to be integrated, most i think would deny that.
i gather that from your posts that you do think that deep physics actually does make the brain special.
do you think that consciousness is fundamental?
because if you do then i would have to take you for an emergent materialist.
i find it difficult to believe that you believe that consciousness be less than fundamentally different becuase of your lines like:
“conscious experience marks the existence of at least one more independent direction for arranging things than are considered in relativity.”
in my previous posts i compared the conscious mind to ‘tomatoiness’ and you didnt seem to object.
so if i superimpose ‘tomatoiness’ i get:
“tomatoiness marks the existence of at least one more independent direction for arranging things than are considered in relativity.”
which seems to me to be silly.
now i can barely work with 4 dimensions, but i acknowledge that i am totally out of my depth with 5.
however when you say:
“The principle advantage from the point of view of conscious experience is that an extra dimension gives us a ‘point of view’. In a 5D spacetime there are points such that:
0 = dx2 + dy2 + dz2 – (cdt)2 + dT2
Taken literally (ie:with an existent dimensional time) this allows events at two times to be in one place simultaneously.
If we can have a length of experienced time available at this
instant then we can see movements and hear whole bars of tunes in the way that we see and hear them.”
imm a bit in the dark about how your that conscious experience has anything to do with 5D events occupying the one place simulataneously.
but it seems that your saying that there is a central point to consciousness.
(although not a simple physical point: http://newempiricism.blogspot.com/2009/01/dualism-is-physical-problem.html)
i gather that many materialist philosophers like Daniel Dennett explicitly deny the existance of any such point.
and it a truely bold and rather ingeneous thing to see if the classical physical rejection of conscious experience can be revamped by modern physics.
now imm still skeptical.
You didnt seem to have a problem with the statement that i made before:
“some of these particles may occasionally be in quantum superposition states (where their joint properties are indeterminate) or the ‘events’ of one particle may occupy the same position in spacetime as the ‘event’ of another.
but yet – no matter what – they still are distinct and my brain is composed of them.”
if you accept this statement then imm not sure how going to 5+ dimensions would help.
if all of the particles of my brain were occupying the same coordinates (in space, time, spacetime, 5D… etc) with respect to some dimensional space, even if that were the case, would that make the brain or conscious experience a unity?
but either way – what i can say is that whatever relativity does to the brain it should also do with the tomato and therefore i understand that adding dimensions really wont help to solve the ‘hard problem’ of the mind itself.
infact i origionally thought that that was what you were trying to say.
anyway, i must truely congratulate you for thinking outside the square on these subjects.
i think i will certainly think harder about how conscious experience relates to time and space.
thank you.
Thank you for your considered reply to my post.
I wrote that consciousness marks the existence of other directions for arranging things in spacetime and you asked how this differed from tomatoiness. You said:
“tomatoiness marks the existence of at least one more independent direction for arranging things than are considered in relativity.”
(Which is an epic sentence! I cannot stop laughing when I read it so I’ll continue later)
Hi,
I think that conscious experience is neither fundamental nor purely derived from the interaction between particles.
Plato described the arrangement of our experience when he said that our minds consisted of forms viewed from a mind’s eye (Aristotle, Reid, Descartes etc. all said something similar). So the arrangement of our experience looks like an interaction between space and time so that the particles that compose it can be both arranged in space and time and at a common point. I have pointed out that if dimensional time exists then physics allows arrangements that are indeed arranged in space and time and at a common point (see Note 1). The particles do not interact although the point is one of the places where immediate interaction between particles might be possible. This arrangement does not really correspond to your two categories of being either fundamental or interacting.
Returning to tomatoes, yes, tomatoes will have the same type of spacetime as a brain; no, they will not be aware because the particles within them are not the output-input of an information processor. It would be conceivable that any point in the universe might have an arrangement of things similar to the arrangement that we call experience but it would lack active awareness. There would even be a point, a centre of the universe, where all of the sensible time slices of the universe would be present yet separate.
Note 1: Imagine a ring of particles. Distances between any two particles at any instant can be measured by placing a tape measure across the ring. Now consider the way the particles persist in time and imagine this persistence as a cylinder composed of the instantaneous rings. Distances along the cylinder are measured in seconds or in (ct) metres where c is a constant (numerically equal to the speed of light). If we put a device that measures length inside the cylinder the separation of the particles can be measured. It is known that a measuring device gives bizarre readings in these circumstances, for instance, the distance, x, between two particles separated by ‘d’ metres and ‘t’ seconds is given by x^2 = d^2 – (ct)^2 so, if ct=d then the separation of the particles is zero. (Of course the measuring device would need to be riding on the back of a photon, or actually be a photon). If all the possible measurements inside the cylinder our considered there is an infinity of lines between points, some of these lines, in directions where (ct=d) are of no length and the points at each end are connected.
hello John.
i think imm beginning to understand you.
i understand that you think of the aware mind as a particular kind of input/output infomation processor.
this kind of processor is instantiated in the neurones in a persons head.
“Plato described the arrangement of our experience when he said that our minds consisted of forms viewed from a mind’s eye ”
and from this i understand that you believe that the mind and mental contents are type identical with certain infomation processes in the brain.
from the inside of the infomation process these things appear as Qualia, awareness and thought but from the outside only appear as physical events (forms).
please tell me if imm wrong, however imm not quizzing you on this – indeed i (almost) dont see anything contradictory or impossible about this at all.
i do understand what ‘light-like’ separated events are and how arrangements of events can have the same coordinates in spacetime.
my question is why does spacetime (or 5D space etc.) matter at all.
if the physical events or particles that are correlated with the content of consciousness are given the same coordinates with respect to some basis, why should that matter?
it seems like your saying is that our consciousness appears to occur at a point, and physics may collapse the coordinates of the particles of any object (such as the brain) to a point.
so what?
i still think my dichotomy between fundamental and not fundamental still holds.
for instance if particles are fundamental in nature then anything that results from their interaction is secondary.
and if infomation (input/output processing) is fundamental in nature then every different infomation process is fundamentally distinct.
so for instance if particles were fundamental then the resulting mind would be secondary (and hence it would be silly for fundamental physics to be tied to it)
if infomation processes were fundamental then the physical mind would be fundamentally distinct and the particles composing the brain would be of secondary importance.
so your statement:
“I think that conscious experience is neither fundamental nor purely derived from the interaction between particles. ”
to me that reads like: ‘conscious experience is neither fundamental nor purely not fundamental’ – what is left?
if you hold the position of thinking that infomation is fundamental then i have no problems with that whatsoever.
indeed i do seem to get the impression that it is directly advocated by people such as David Chalmers and that it is a very respectable thesis.
Thank you for these interestin discussion points, here are my replies.
You wrote: “it seems like [what] your saying is that our consciousness appears to occur at a point, and physics may collapse the coordinates of the particles of any object (such as the brain) to a point.
so what?”
If the point were purely spatial then I would agree with your comment “so what?”, but the point is spatio-temporal. It connects events that are arranged in time. It is this aspect that makes all the difference.
Imagine someone saying “beta”, the whole word “beta” enters your experience, you do not hear 400 ms of “be”, the “be” disappear and then 400 ms of “ta” appear. If your extended present were 0 secs long you would hear nothing at all. The extension in time occurs at the apparent position of the lips of the person who speaks a word and subtends an angle through spacetime to the observation point that is at an instant and not extended in time. This allows us to hear words now even though they take time. Without this relationship between the viewing point and the things in experience we would hear no words, see no movements and hence know nothing.
Look around a room, you reach forward to pick up things from nearby space, you walk into more distant space and you re-focus your eyes as you gaze from near to far. These actions are arranged in time and provide a sense of depth (the “action space” of psychophysics). It is having things in the plane connected simultaneously at a point things temporally away from the plane but also connected simultaneously at a point that gives us spatial experience.
So the first answer to “so what” is that a spatio-temporal point describes our experience whereas a spatial layout does not.
The second answer to “so what” involves incorrigibility. Consider “Cogito ergo sum”, if experience were a succession of spatial layouts then each instant would be separate from the next and we could not be sure that what happened a second ago actually happened. However, if it is the nature of the world to be time extended and our experience involves this time extension then “exist?” and the nod that answers “of course” can share the same extended present moment. (Although it is actually only necessary to show that presentism or presentist arguments are false to answer the attacks on the Cogito).
On fundamental vs non-fundamental, you said: “to me that reads like: ‘conscious experience is neither fundamental nor purely not fundamental’ – what is left?”
I do not see why there is a difficulty with the statement that conscious experience is not fundamental and not solely derived from particle interactions that are not fundamental, it might be derived from other non-fundamental things like a particular configuration of spacetime. Spacetime may well be fundamental (although I am not certain) but it has an infinity of configurations because the dimensions interact.
The problem with Chalmers’ approach is that he seems to ignore several possibilities such as information being due to configurations of objects (rather than consciousness) and the replacement of the brain in Pylyshyn’s thought experiment being affected by the spatiotemporal form of the brain rather than the spatial form.
In fact Chalmers approach to information puzzles me. I would propose that there is no information without representation. Information is simply arrangements of things in spacetime. The basic components of reality (particles? geometrodynamic entities? etc.) have at least 4 extensive dimensions in which they can be arranged and it is this possibility that gives rise to information. Information processing transfers arrangements from place to place and alters arrangements of things and if transfers were to create conscious experience there would be the problem of infinite regression noted by Aristotle and endless philosophers thereafter. Awareness relies on a continual manipulation of the content of consciousness by the information processor that is the non-conscious part of the brain. Conscious experience is the combination of this information processing with a spatiotemporal form that avoids the regress argument because it is time extended, it can have both a colour and the processes related to ‘colour’ in the same extended present.
thank you John.
i truely agree with you, i really do think that conscious awareness and understanding hinges critically on continued experience through time.
your ‘beta’ thought experiment illustrates this nicely.
my point is that i dont think special relativity alone will give you time extension.
you said: ‘but the point is spatio-temporal. It connects events that are arranged in time. It is this aspect that makes all the difference’
does a point connect anything?
ok, so two events which occupy the same point in spacetime have a ‘connecting’ relationship between their coordinates in space and their coordinates in time.
but indeed any two events identified by positions in spacetime, even if they dont occupy the same point will have a ‘connecting’ relationship between coordinates.
this same kind of thing could be said of individual and unrelated 2D points on a cartesian plane.
we both know that a particle (for instance) has a continuing existance through time that is represented by a continuous series of spacetime events (ok – so a bit more complex for QM).
or as an analogue: a line (or any 2D object with x/y extension) is represented by a continuous series of 2D points.
Perhaps it could be claimed that representation, infomation, forms, etc. had time extension and thus could be represented in the same way.
fair enough.
what imm saying is that just as a continuous series of 2D points does not imply connectedness (eg. of a single line), so too with a series of 4D events – even if they occupy the same point.
you can of coarse infer connectedness but that is not something you derive from the theory itself.
with regards to David Chalmers, i gather that his idea of infomation is without representation.
I thought Chalmers located his panpsychic thermostat in the position of the thermostat and that his dualist functions operated in time. Temporal and spatial form looks like representation to me, even if the representation is in terms of a property.
You asked a probing question: “what i’m saying is that just as a continuous series of 2D points does not imply connectedness (eg. of a single line), so too with a series of 4D events – even if they occupy the same point.”
My answer is that experience is not active, as Berkeley said, ideas are passive, so it is enough that the contents of conscious experience can adopt the form of conscious experience. Our perception does not perform processes, processing is done with the information processor that is most of our brain. (See Conscious free will). The connection at a point is just a marker of a geometrical form that we observe in our perception, not a point that receives data or performs processing. As Aristotle said, the mind that is actively thinking is the objects that it thinks, the objects do not need to flow into a point, they perform processing well enough out there in the brain. Our mental objects are arranged in the space and time of the brain even though a part of every mental object is also directed at a common point, being of no net extension in the direction of the point and no distance from that point.
But what is the use of a geometric form? My guess is that the things within that form (ie: within conscious experience) get an advantage from being there, such as being our perspective on a quantum multiverse. (There are no qm superpositions in conscious experience even though these should occasionally happen (ie: coarse grained histories in our brains)).
well to be honest i dont much understand David Chalmers anyway, but the idea of infomation as fundamental seems to have impressive credentials, my point was that you should feel free to take such a position if you wanted to.
imm not sure you understood my last post, my claim was that SR alone will not give you connectedness or time extension of anything at all.
that is regardless of wether the mind/perception/brain is active or passive, a point or not and irrespective of geometrical form and infomation processing.
“what i’m saying is that just as a continuous series of 2D points does not imply connectedness (eg. of a single line), so too with a series of 4D events – even if they occupy the same point.”
was exactly what i ment.
“my claim was that SR alone will not give you connectedness or time extension of anything at all.”
Given that connectedness and time extension are different concepts I will start with time extension. The inherent, observer independent, length of an object in a 3D space is given from dr^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 (where d means “delta”), in a 4D space it is h^2 = dr^2 – (cdt)^2 and this formula was developed as part of SR (See Wikibook on SR. The time extension of an object is dt.
Sorry, I had to do something important. To continue the last post:
This time extension, dt, varies with the observer’s state as well as being dependent on any ‘at rest’ time extension of the object. (That objects might have a time extension when they are at rest is suggested by the energy-time version of the uncertainty principle.) To go any further with this analysis would be highly speculative so I’ll stop there on time extension.
Connectedness is another problem. I have been using the idea of lack of separation as being connected. Any theory of space-time separations, such as SR, will be concerned with connectedness in this sense. Did you have another idea of connectedness?
aah, i think i see where we’ve been missing each others points.
so time extension of an object is dt, and this of course only makes sense when you have a differentiable function.
so if the mind were to be considered as a function of the positions of the particles in the brain, then just as the particles themselves would have time extension then so too (probably..) would the functions of them.
so for instance: the center of mass of a binary star is time extended because it is a function of the two stars position with time.
so the mind could be defined by a function (perhaps represented by a point) of the positions of the particles of the brain with time – and so have time extension.
its all making sense. lol!
imm sorry, i just wasnt thinking in that direction.
ill try to illustrate the conundrum i think i was having in understanding you.
immagine my brain were two dice and i threw these two die onto a table.
now the results of the two die would be independant and unconnected (in the statistical sense) and it wouldnt matter what relation these two events in spacetime, they would still remain totally distinct.
and each of the individual events (that is the showing of a number on each die, perhaps located at the central dot.) – even if they occupied the same position in spacetime – could only have Zero time extension anyway.
however a function of the two die together (such as the sum of the two numbers) would be dependant and connected with both the die.
and a function such as the center of mass of the two die would not only be dependant on the two die, but have time extension with them.
so the events in the left and right hemispheres of my brain may well be largely independant.
and no treatment in spacetime is going to unite (or give time extension to) the individual fireings of unrelated neurones.
yet if the mind were a function of the neurones together (and not just the events of their firing) then that would be a different story.
imm kicking myself for having not understood you.
imm thinking to myself: ‘duh. its called functionalism for a reason…’
imm really sorry for having taken up so much of your time.
thank you for responding.
Extension in time is the elephant in the room of physics. If you look at QCD, QED, Energy-time uncertainty, entanglement etc they all deal with or strongly suggest things that are extended in time. The problem of incorpoprating time into physics probably originates with Einstein who explained his solution to the “hole problem” of general relativity thus:
“That the requirement of general covariance, which takes away from space and time the last remnant of physical objectivity, is a natural one, will be seen from the following reflection. All our space-time verifications invariably amount to a determination of space-time coincidences. If, for example, events consisted merely in the motion of material points, then ultimately nothing would be observable but the meetings of two or more of these points. Moreover, the results of our measurings are nothing but verifications of such meetings of the material points of our measuring instruments with other material points, coincidences between the hands of the a clock and points on the clock dial, and observed point-events happening at the same place at the same time. The introduction of a system of reference serves no other purpose than to facilitate the description of the totality of such coincidences”. (Einstein 1916).”
This is essential for GR in the form that it is taught today but it torpedoed the possibility of action at a distance that the “physically objective” space-time of Special Relativity permitted. In the 1930s Bohr and others were openly speculating that quantum mechanics was related, Bohr, when comparing SR and QM, noted in his Warsaw lecture in 1938:
“Even the formalisms, which in both theories within their scope offer adequate means of comprehending all conceivable experience, exhibit deep-going analogies. In fact, the astounding simplicity of the generalisation of classical physical theories, which are obtained by the use of multidimensional [non-positive-definite] geometry and non-commutative algebra, respectively, rests in both cases essentially on the introduction of the conventional symbol sqrt(-1). The abstract character of the formalisms concerned is indeed, on closer examination, as typical of relativity theory as it is of quantum mechanics, and it is in this respect purely a matter of tradition if the former theory is considered as a completion of classical physics rather than as a first fundamental step in the thorough-going revision of our conceptual means of comparing observations, which the modern development of physics has forced upon us.”
But then it became obvious to physicists that sqrt(-1) was not fundamental to GR. The equivalent of sqrt(-1) can be fundamental to SR (ie: a signature of +++- or —+ implies a negative dimension) but without a “physically objective” spacetime this is meaningless.
John, thank you for responding, and they are some very impressive quotes. imm sorry to disapoint but i dont have any of my own.
imm not sure what you were saying in your last post.
How exactly were you saying that sqrt(-1) in the formalism of physics has influence on the discussion of the mind?
in my previous post i gave the illustration of the center of gravity as a function of particles extended over time – that was just an illustration.
even if this point does not have a ‘physically objective’ existance, it certainly has an abstract existance throughout time.
why not the same with the mind?
sorry, imm not sure exactly what your saying.
Actually, as you spotted, I did get carried away with the quotes.
I should have said that there has always been a battle in physics between relationalism and substantivalism and that the two standpoints might be reconciled by a proper treatment of dimensional time. In Bohr’s day this appeared to involve a thorough understanding of the physical significance of “imaginary” numbers and today it involves a very similar problem (a physical understanding of metric tensors that have both positive and negative values on the principal diagonal).
Anyway, as you say, this would have been a bit tangential to your post! However, I hope you will forgive me for going off on a slightly different tangent before answering your post about the dice.
Einstein gave an example of how the introduction of extra dimensions affects the coexistence of objects. He described a sheet of paper with two dots on it and demonstrated that because length, breadth and depth are interdependent the plane sheet could be folded through the remaining degree of freedom so that dots that are separate in 2D can be together in 3D. The fact that dimensional time has a different signature from the spatial dimensions greatly expedites this “folding” (two spacetime points are in contact when 0 = dr^2 – (cdt)^2). Notice that the dots on the paper never leave the paper, they don’t flow into the 3D point of contact, it appears to be the same in our minds – the events in our brains are arranged in their original space and times but are also at a point.
The interdependence of space and time also means that the philosophical criticism of the extended present moment as “specious” because two events at two separate times cannot be simultaneous does not apply if the events can be “folded” together through spacetime.
To return to your dice, as you say, the conjoint characteristics of the dice could be at spacetime point. The hypothesis that experience is at a spacetime point goes further than this because a short period of the history of the dice also appears to be at the point. Things in our experience appear to be laid out in time but also at a spacetime point and it is this layout in dimensional time that makes whole intentions into real, physical entities. For example, suppose the dice roll towards each other, the “intentional” explanation of our awareness of this rolling together is that our awareness is “about” the active path that joins the dice. Our experience is indeed like the intentional description but there is one big difference: the movement in experience is not just an intentional property, the dice are actually moving in our experience. Actual movement requires a 4D set of events, it cannot be done in 3D. This means that intentions are not just properties, they are occasions, little slices of both time and space.
hey john, please feel free to quote at will.
and feel free to take as many tangents as you wish just providing you do eventually link it with the mind so that i know the relevance of what your saying.
just a quick question: you said that
‘dots that are separate in 2D can be together in 3D’
and ‘the dots … don’t flow into the 3D point of contact’ hmm.
did you get that backward: in that points that are appart in 3D can be together in 2D?
it seems that what your saying is:
1. the mind is a function of the physical brain.
2. all physical things exist in spacetime
3. the mind seems to exists at a point in spacetime (or 5+ dimensions etc) and therefore probably is.
4. thus the content of experience (and intentions) exists in spacetime
5. and therefore: “This means that intentions are not just properties, they are occasions, little slices of both time and space.”
i dont see anything wrong with this logic.
you then went on to say that: ’short histories’ would then be contained at the central point in the mind and thats how intentionality comes about.
sure enough individual events may occupy the same position in spacetime.
but of a series of spacetime events being ’short periods of history’ is a very very lurid expression.
and the point of spacetime that is the function of my mind containing these things like a bathtub contains water – is even more picturesque.
and yet again: does a point itself contain anything? maybee so.
i dont really object to this kind of thing, after all we are talking about the mind here.
so maybee so.
“and the point of spacetime that is the function of my mind containing these things like a bathtub contains water – is even more picturesque.
and yet again: does a point itself contain anything? maybee so.”
The proposal that the events in our minds are events in spacetime is actually trivial from a physical viewpoint – what else would they be? It is how such a bathtub full of events could be arranged in the geometric form of our experience that is less trivial. Although I think that geometrical analysis is the way forward I also think you are right to be wary of geometric terminology – what I would like to say is that experience is a surface vector that acts as a 4D vector directed at a point. The simple symbolic maths then ends up with a zero for the point and appropriate directed elements or ‘vectors’ but then we have: ‘vector’, ’surface’, ‘point’, ‘directed’ and ‘element’ as words that require elaboration. As you point out there is also the problem of ‘connection’.
This problem of connection is intriguing – the inherent 3D form of an object is dependent on the invariant lengths expressed by Pythagoras’ theorem and the inherent 4D form is dependent on the 4D invariant lengths (spacetime intervals). The 4D form depends upon the inherent temporal extension of an object so the question naturally arises as to how far a given object is inherently extended in time. Do objects exist as short temporal lengths that shuttle along the time axis or are they pinned into this time axis? (cf: Mctaggart’s ‘unreality of time’). If they shuttle along the time axis like out conscious observation then we will need a 5th dimension to host the shuttling because otherwise objects will be both in time and outside of it.
yes, i think we agree.
“The proposal that the events in our minds are events in spacetime is actually trivial from a physical viewpoint – what else would they be?” – exactly.
and yes, words like ‘vector’, ’surface’, ‘point’, ‘directed’ and ‘element’ dont nessisarily correspond to anything other than mathematically abstract objects and hence they need further elaboration if we wish to say anything substancial about the world through physics at all.
with regard to ‘connectedness’ and time extension of whole objects, i can only see this mattering from a non-reductionistic viewpoint. (perhaps with the exception of individial particles)
perhaps a whole object eg. tomato could simply be said to have time extension for howeverlong the particles satisfy the criteria of a tomato.
but i have no idea of how this nebular definition would relate to spacetime, 5D etc.